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Abstract
The abuse and neglect of older people in care homes is widespread across England, but 
current causative explanations are limited and frequently fail to highlight the economic 
and political factors underpinning poor care. Informed by social harm and state–corporate 
crime perspectives, this study uses ethnographic data gathered through a nine-month period 
of working in an older person’s residential care home to show how neglect is embedded in 
working routines. Three aspects of care are interrogated to reveal the embedded nature of 
harm in the home; all reveal the rift between official, regulatory rules and informal working 
practices shaped by material constraints of the labor process. This article explores the role 
of regulatory regimes in actively legitimizing sectors, such as the residential care industry, 
even in the face of routine violence, by bureaucratically ensuring the appearance of com-
pliance with formal rules. While the harms of contemporary institutionalized care for older 
people have its roots in material conditions, performative compliance through regulation 
guarantees that these injurious outcomes are concealed. This article contends that malprac-
tice (and harm) can be explained with reference to conjoint state–corporate relationships 
and practices.
Introduction
While concerns about the quality of adult social care in England are raised frequently, this 
often occurs only in light of serious instances of care failings reported in the media (Flynn 
and Citarella 2013; Sussex County Council 2014). Such occurrences are usually portrayed 
as anomalous cases—or what Whyte (2014: 241) calls “moments of rupture”—with abuse 
or severe neglect constructed as particular wrongful events and with the finger of blame 
pointed at temporary regulatory failure, inept managers or even “evil” care workers. At 
best, and as Ferguson and Lavalette (2013) point out, the “crisis” in adult social care is due 
to an aging population or unaffordable welfare budgets, rather than decades of marketi-
zation and privatization policies. Current academic research on the matter tends to look 
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more at organizational contexts without considering political economy, citing factors such 
as poor “leadership” or inadequate “staff training” (Furness 2006; Marsland et al. 2015), or 
focusing on micro-interactional phenomena, such as agism or risk factors relating to vic-
tims and perpetrators (Stevens et al. 2013).
Using a workplace-based participant methodology, where I assumed the role of a care 
assistant, this article offers what might be described as ethnography of state–corporate 
crime and challenges some of the conventional explanations of failing care. It focuses on 
the pressures and constraints that frontline workers face in attempting to meet the needs of 
older people and explores some of the resulting routinized harms. This article finds that 
regulation largely fails to ensure appropriate standards of care and that the actions on-the-
floor contravene officially endorsed caring processes.
In this article, the connections between the criminogenic practices exposed are explained 
with reference to a particular manner in which capital accumulation is instituted in the care 
sector. I attempt to go beyond both conventional state–corporate crime approaches and the 
policy-focused care literature in order to offer a deeper analysis of “crimes of the power-
ful” through an exploration of the political and economic foundations of harm within care 
facilities (Whyte 2014). The analysis seeks to locate an explanation for the revealed neglect 
with reference to “symbiotic” and interdependent relationships between state-based regula-
tory authorities and large corporate service providers (Tombs 2012). The data presented 
suggest that neglect might be understood with reference to, on the one hand, underfunding 
in the welfare system as the state seeks to constrain costs of social reproduction, particu-
larly for non-laboring populations, coupled with the desire by successive governments to 
provide a platform for profit-generation to large multinational capital. As a result of these 
conditions of capital accumulation, regulation is not driven by an identifiable effort to actu-
ally scrutinize caring but might instead be termed performative compliance, where differ-
ent organizational forces seek to give the illusion that they are conforming to the “agreed” 
rules of delivery. As this article demonstrates, this performative compliance, coupled with 
sector-wide underfunding, helps to structure a range of routine forms of care violence, 
where even basic needs of residents are not secured. In essence, this article demonstrates 
that the particular institutionalization of accumulation prevalent in the residential sector for 
older individuals has resulted in severe harm and neglect for many residents.
Theoretical Framework: State–Corporate Symbiosis and Social Harm
Earlier theories of state–corporate harm focused on instances where governmental and 
business actors, in cooperation, generate outcomes that result in fatalities, deteriorating 
well-being or other deleterious effects (e.g., Kramer et  al. 2002). Conventionally, these 
harms have been understood as either “state-initiated” or “state-facilitated” (Kramer et al. 
2002: 271–272). The former refers to situations where a state directly employs or commis-
sions corporations to engage in harmful practices, such as the employment of private mili-
tias to engage in war crimes. The latter represents cases where the state, especially through 
inactivity, fails to hold corporations accountable for wrongdoing—often due to mutu-
ally held objectives. Harms resulting from a lack of regulation might be conceptualized 
through this latter category because such harmful business activities are tolerated due to 
insufficient intensity of regulatory effort. In a number of publications, however, Tombs and 
Whyte (e.g., Tombs 2012, 2016; Whyte 2014) have argued that this understanding of state-
facilitated crime or harm fails to conceptualize the deep-rooted constitutional, material 
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and institutional co-dependencies of “the state” and corporations. Offering a “soft” cri-
tique of conventional state–corporate crime studies, Tombs (2012: 174) argues that this 
area of study has tended to focus on particular relationships between specific organizations 
(between a regulator and a corporation, for instance) in order to understand how violent 
aftereffects emerge as particular “events” or “instances” of state–corporate crime. This 
focus on incidents as emergent from specific organizational relationships elides more pro-
found reflection on how states and corporations dually co-create regimes of accumulation, 
and how these regimes of accumulation may produce mass injury. So, for example, Tombs 
and Whyte (2007) and Tombs (2016) have shown convincingly how the regulatory regime 
in the United Kingdom (UK) in its entirety—and demonstrable across many specific indus-
tries (from food catering to construction)—has moved increasingly to a position endorsing 
pro-economic “progress” and at the expense of (or instead of) actual enforcement.
This body of research casts considerable doubt on traditional conceptions of regulation 
and even basic conceptions of the relationship between government and business. Rather 
than conceiving of regulatory authorities as policing markets and profit-making entities, 
or even conceptualizing the state as inherently oppositional or distinct from business, it 
makes sense to see states (and governmental organizations) as co-determining the ideologi-
cal, institutional, legal, and social context for accumulation. Indeed, corporations rely on 
the state to sustain conditions favorable to and essential for the continued existence of cor-
porate activities (Tombs and Whyte 2015). Privatization policies, legal/policy frameworks 
establishing labor conditions, direct payments through contracts or subsidies, promulgation 
of a range of narratives, and the maintenance of a holistic socio-legal order are all state 
activities that create the institutional and ideological platform for corporate accumulation. 
Regulation, despite being constructed within mainstream neoliberal politics as an external 
anti-business policer of corporations, can be viewed alternatively as a central component 
of the overall institutional matrix that enables and institutionalizes accumulation. While 
regulation often provides workers, citizens and the environment some modicum of protec-
tion, direct intervention by the state is more often than not an attempt to nullify the most 
damaging aspects of corporate power (Tombs and Whyte 2010a, b). Within the concep-
tion that regulation may actually be conducive with maintaining corporate activity, regula-
tion can be conceived as having two primary purposes. First, it helps to secure the overall 
social order within which accumulation occurs by containing (some of) the most negative 
aspects of corporate activity but, second, it also has a more inventive function in that it 
institutes markets. Accordingly, regulatory agencies “are caught somewhere between the 
despotic and the infrastructural, the coercive and the creative functions of states” (Whyte 
2014: 240).
In order to demonstrate how the particular institutionalization of accumulation in resi-
dential care for older people produces harm, this article also develops some insights from 
social harm theory. The studying of harm is premised on the political assertion that state-
defined categories of “crime” are inherently limiting and that a focus on emotional, mate-
rial, physical, psychological or social damage can overcome moral relativism, refocusing 
attentions on how capitalism produces maltreatment. This article borrows from expansive 
and ontological conceptions which generally equate harm with a transgression of some 
primary or elementary dimension of humanness or being (Garside 2013; Lasslett 2010; 
Pemberton 2015). Pemberton’s (2015: 24) needs-based conception of social harm guides 
researchers to explore empirically the role of “relations, processes, flows, practices, dis-
course, actions and inactions” (emphasis in original) in structuring different forms of 
injury to individuals’ corporeal states, psychological conditions, and abilities to achieve 
self-actualization.
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Before presenting my ethnographic data, this article highlights some of the sectoral con-
ditions shaping the harms discussed later and, in particular, the structural conditions which 
create models of profit dependent on extreme cost-saving.
Institutionalizing Accumulation in Older People’s Residential Care in England
Since the late 1980s, market competition in social care has developed with the involve-
ment of private, state and charitable contenders in a “mixed” economy (Beresford 2005). 
Large-scale corporations dominate but are funded largely through local/central government 
budgets, as payment for care home fees usually derive from a mix of personal finances and 
state-support. In 2008, 58% of private homes were owned and operated by large corpo-
rate providers in England in a sector where 81% of establishments are operated for profit 
(Lewis and West 2014: 2). In other words, money paid directly by the state is perhaps 
the most dependable and substantial income source for the residential care industry. In 
2013–2014, 50% of residents in private and voluntary sector homes were either wholly or 
partially funded by local government and a further 7% are paid for by the National Health 
Service (NHS) (Grant Thornton 2014: 11). Local authorities—the primary unit of local 
public service provision in the UK—tend to favor low-cost providers when they are shoul-
dering some or all of the expenses. This tends to constrain fees (Fotaki et al. 2013) with the 
result that providers have sought a range of identifiable strategies aimed at limiting costs. 
These include large-scale employment of migrant workers (Cangiano et  al. 2009), seek-
ing reductions in production expenses (Collins 2012), and engaging in complex financial 
restructuring initiatives (Scourfield 2012).
While local and central government funding constrains fees paid to providers, it also 
appears that considerable effort is devoted to attempting to regulate and standardize care 
procedures. The Care Quality Commission (CQC) sets the “fundamental standards,” which 
are the benchmark for care in any formal service. These cover areas such as “person-cen-
tred care,” “food and drink,” “staffing” and “premises and equipment.” These standardized 
frameworks for regulating care have been criticized widely. The focus on person-centered 
care, in particular, is a manifestation of the personalization agenda, where welfare users 
are imagined as consumers in a market, and quality is imagined as being synonymous with 
delivering “choice” and “control” (Ferguson 2007). Some argue that policy and provision 
remains concerned primarily with more biomedical aspects of caring. Lewis and West 
(2014: 3), for example, argue that the regulatory and policy focus has shifted toward “out-
comes and measures,” with less attention being paid to rigorous inspection procedures, the 
core care relationship, or the capacity of organizations to enable socially beneficial care 
environments. Perhaps more importantly, regulation appears to have failed to secure a basic 
level of quality in service delivery with widespread reports from across England and the 
UK of understaffing across organizations.
The exact manner in which capital accumulation has been instituted within the residen-
tial care for older people sector has led to a series of systemic problems of funding. Avail-
able evidence would also seem to suggest that regulatory efforts have failed to secure qual-
ity care across the sector (Moore 2018). The findings of this study unpack the dynamics 
within one care home to reveal how the specific institutionalization of accumulation within 
the sector compels a rationalizing of the costs of production, seeking savings in all aspects 
of service design, while government regulation fails in securing quality services, arguably 
because it is more concerned with endorsing the sector than actually policing it.
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Methods and Ethnographic Setting
This ethnographic study attempts to understand the competing pressures that influence care 
with reference to the actors involved, descriptions of tasks, events, language, organiza-
tional goals, uses (and abuses) of technology, and spatial arrangements (Rees and Gatenby 
2014: 14–15). Analysis goes beyond the discursive dimensions of life in the home and 
attempts to explain and document more material and embodied aspects, such as tenden-
cies in working patterns and resulting relationships between actors. Data were collected 
during nine months of participant ethnography during which I assumed employment as a 
care assistant. Between two and four 12-hour shifts were undertaken each week. Between 
25 and 35 residents inhabited the home but numbers changed relatively rapidly as people 
came and went for respite, were admitted to hospital, or died. Residents suffered, to vary-
ing degrees, from a complex combination of emotional, physical and psychological prob-
lems, and the vast majority had received a diagnosis of dementia.
Data collection and analysis involved collecting and developing detailed research notes. 
Thorough descriptions of conversations and events were recorded in the hours and days 
after each shift. Recording events and dialogs accurately was the utmost concern. Descrip-
tive notes were supplemented with theoretical, reflective and conceptual expansions—
sometimes referred to as “theoretical memos” (Montgomery and Bailey 2007: 65). In eth-
nographic research, there are well-recognized problems with recording precise and exact 
descriptions of events (LeCompte and Goetz 1982). For instance, when participating in 
social events, ethnographers may be able to make only “headnotes,” requiring them to 
write up the events in more detail at a later moment (Emerson et al. 1995). Thus, I cannot 
claim that the statements that appear in the following sections reflect word-for-word what 
was said, but they are representations of my memories of events and discussions. The data 
presented are an attempt to represent the overall organization of work and the difficulties-
facing workers as they struggle to ensure the well-being of residents. Vignettes in the form 
of quotations are employed to provide a sense of the people and the problems faced.
The project was subject to extensive ethical review from both an institutional review 
panel and the head of my university’s law school. The study involved some practices that 
are considered ethically sensitive by prevailing standards. Informed consent was not gath-
ered from some participants in the social context, including residents and family members. 
Throughout various forms of ethical examination, some degree of non-disclosure was sup-
ported by those reviewing the study. The panel stated that it supported the research project 
because care homes were known sites of harmful outcomes, funded largely through pub-
lic monies, and shielded from scrutiny by corporate actors. Alvesalo-Kuusi and Whyte’s 
(2018) recent article on redesigning ethics for research with powerful or elite groups 
argues that the permissibility of different strategies should be based on collective or univer-
sal interests, rather than professional or institutional priorities. They point toward a “para-
dox” in conventional ethics, whereby current standards of ethics are designed to address 
power imbalances between researched and researcher, but the same rules tend to protect the 
powerful. This project is concerned with how states and corporations engage in organizing 
harm, and both the researcher and formal ethical procedures decreed that some suspension 
of conventional customs were justified. Parker and Crabtree (2014: 37), writing specifically 
on the use of covert methodologies for uncovering abuses within adult social care settings, 
argue that “covert or semi-covert research, where consent is not always possible, is one 
way in which we can uncover truths that need to be heard, but may not be heard using con-
ventional methods.”
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Specific recommendations emerged from the institutional review process regarding 
what was permissible conduct for the study. Where possible, I obtained consent informally 
from workers and care home managers. Regarding initial entry into the home, I obtained 
consent from the employing manager. Likewise, many of the workers were aware that I 
was conducting research into care quality and was drawing on experiences of working in 
the home. So, while the research had a covert element, it did not involve direct deception 
(Spicker 2011). I made clear that protecting the well-being of the older people was the 
utmost propriety for my study and, as such, adhered to a number of measures that were 
suggested to me. All research tasks, such as recording notes and writing up field observa-
tions, took place outside of work-time. During shifts, my primary objective was a commit-
ment to care responsibilities and to meeting the needs of residents. Securing the anonymity 
of all residents and their family members, as well as workers and managers, was paramount 
(and all names used here are pseudonyms). The location of the home remains secret. As far 
as possible, the focus was maintained on work practices, organizational issues and short-
comings in care quality.
State–Corporate Structuring of Neglect: Chronic Underfunding
In this context, two pressures represent the epicenter of state–corporate structuring of 
neglect: first, work was performed in an under-resourced, low-staffed environment; and 
second, compliance with regulation occurred only rarely. A range of cost-reduction strate-
gies were employed by the home to maintain low inputs, including depleted personnel-
to-resident ratios. When care staff were absent due to illness, replacements were sought 
infrequently. Regularly, residents needed to be accompanied to appointments with general 
practitioners or to the hospital, requiring one care assistant to be “off the floor” for some 
hours. Usually, there were between five and seven care workers on shift, but at times, the 
number fell to three and, on one occasion, only two workers were present. The accepted 
minimum staffing ratio at the time was 1:5 (workers to residents). Frequently, the home 
was in breach of this standard.
Managerial objectives aimed at further cost cutting maintained low expenditure 
throughout the home. The entertainment budget (used for birthdays and other such events) 
had been withdrawn and a “Caring for Dementia” course, aimed at developing demen-
tia-specific communication and care skills, had also been discontinued. At the time of 
research, the food budget was under threat, and management proposed a cutback of 10 per-
cent despite the budget being an already meager £2.75 per resident, per day (see Collins 
2012). The combination of low labor inputs and a generalized strategy of cost reduction 
resulted in care falling short of regulatory expectations. Many of the needs of individual 
residents were not met, including emotional, social and elementary biological needs.
Care workers and managers often stated strong moral and ethical motivations for meet-
ing the needs of residents. According to Leanne, a senior care assistant, “Not everyone is 
cut out for this job, not everyone can do this job. You’ve got to have something about you, 
a commitment or a calling…You’ve got to be able to put the needs of the residents first.”
Workers often displayed anger or frustration about inadequate staffing. After having 
worked a particularly challenging shift, Magdalena, a care assistant, complained:
There’s never enough people to get through the work. Yesterday me and one other 
did the whole home right up until tea time [11 am]. Three floors with just the two of 
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us…but even when there’s more staff it’s still not right…We never have time to sit or 
just watch TV with the residents or do something different.
In one conversation, the home manger at the time complained about her role in maintaining 
low staffing levels:
I know this [staffing levels] is a problem…I know exactly what you mean, but you’ve 
got to realise that at the end of the day this is a business…and to make profit you’ve 
got to drive down the costs of running the place… I agree that it might be wrong that 
this is a business but this is the way it has gone, and with all these old people it is 
unlikely to change.
On any given day shift, there were three to seven care assistants or senior care assistants, as 
well as one or two cleaners, two to three kitchen staff, one nurse, one janitor/handyman and 
one home manager. Care assistants and senior care assistants carried out the vast majority 
of personal care tasks, while nurses focused on duties requiring medical expertise, such as 
managing medications. Both nurses and care assistants worked 12 h shifts, from 8 am until 
8 pm, or 8 pm to 8 am. Care assistants were paid minimum wage (at the time, £5.80 per 
hour), and senior care assistants earned 21p per hour more. The workforce was multina-
tional with staff members having moved from India, Kenya, Latvia, Malawi, Nigeria, Phil-
ippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Ukraine and Zimbabwe—a reflection of the interna-
tionalized nature of the social care workforce in the UK (Cangiano et al. 2009). Precarious 
situations experienced by migrant workers offered a series of benefits for the employer by 
reducing turnover rates, providing access to “over-skilled” labor, and compelling workers 
to remain in unpleasant working conditions and work a greater numbers of hours (Ander-
son 2010). Those from outside the European Union complained frequently about their visa 
situation, which tied them to the social care sector or even to employment within the home. 
Aneni, a care assistant from Zimbabwe, who worked six 12-h shifts most weeks, explained 
her reasons for continuing to work in social care:
There’s no way I can go back to Zimbabwe because of the political situation…I 
haven’t been able to get asylum so I’m on a visa which ties me to working in social 
care even though in Zimbabwe I was a nurse.
In all aspects of service delivery, including staffing, tertiary costs (such as entertainment), 
and core costs (such as food), management appeared to be attempting to find areas or ways 
in which it could reduce costs and sustain minimal spending. There was an all-encom-
passing strategy to decrease the production costs of delivering care in the home. A private 
equity firm with financial interests in the residential care market argued in an investors 
report in 2014 that maintaining low cost across the sector was central to securing profita-
bility. The then-Head of Private Sector Healthcare at the firm noted that, “government aus-
terity, increasing costs and static fees will continue to erode private sector earnings” (Grant 
Thornton 2014: 5). As the next section demonstrates, the prevailing tendency to seek cost 
reductions in staffing meant state-authorized forms of care were practiced only rarely in the 
home, pushing workers to commit fraudulent acts in order to maintain an appearance of 
quality care for external onlookers.
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State–Corporate Structuring of Neglect: Performative Compliance with Regulation
As in other studies of care work, practices in the home can be understood as having formal 
and informal features (Bolton and Wibberley 2014; Lopez 2007). The formal aspects of the 
work were those written on or into care plans, task sheets and other bureaucratic instru-
ments, which represented the contractual agreements between state and private profit-gen-
erating organizations determining requirements about how much and what work should be 
completed. Two cornerstone bureaucratic apparatuses underpinned the formal dimensions 
of the work. The care plans, initiated on admittance, recorded the individual’s personal 
emotional, physiological, psychological and cultural requirements and preferences—the 
organization’s statement of intent to provide a certain level of service aligned to external 
regulation. The care files provided evidence of tasks completed each day. During shifts, 
care assistants and senior care assistants were required to note each task completed with 
every resident (such as fluid/food intake and incontinence pad changes). The care files also 
recorded tasks completed and were aimed at substantiating the home’s responsiveness to 
needs of residents.
Managers reproved workers not on the basis of whether tasks had been completed, but 
according to whether files reflected regulatory standards. The home managers’ mantra was 
“if it’s not written down, it didn’t happen,” which was also reproduced on a sign above 
the shelves where the care files were stored (see also Diamond 1992). The home manager 
(Karen) would frequently express the importance of “correct” record keeping, especially 
when an external force, such as a resident’s relative or an external organization, had sub-
mitted complaints:
It’s important you write down everything in the care files. And I mean everything. 
If you don’t write down everything how can I protect you? It’s like with Brenda’s 
daughter, she’s gone to the Council complaining that her mum is losing weight, so 
if you don’t write absolutely everything down I can’t prove how much Brenda has 
eaten.
Aside from care files and care plans, the third formal aspect of care work, although not 
purely bureaucratic, was the expectation that staff attend externally and internally provided 
training courses on a range of different aspects of care. Sessions often finished with the 
signing of forms confirming attendance.
The commitment to delivering state-certified care was symbolic, with little direct super-
vision; it entailed formal endorsement of certain practices but informal acceptance of alter-
native working styles. This “mock routinisation,” as framed by Lopez (2007: 225), is sys-
tematic rule-violation expected of workers and sanctioned unofficially by managers.
Care files and plans were scrutinized externally by state agencies and internally by home 
and regional level managers. Frontline staff felt pressured to falsify records, especially care 
files, which tended to be the first documents inspected in the face of complaints. As Bea-
trice, a care assistant, explained:
Nothing in these records reflects the reality of what happened. We sit down every 
evening and write down whatever we have to, to keep them off our back [manage-
ment]…How do I know how many times Betty was turned or how much Jack has 
eaten?
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Workers were placed in a quagmire: by falsifying records, they were committing a fraudu-
lent act and were participating in serious harm (such as inadequate food or hydration for 
particular resident; if they did not, they were risking managerial penance.
Toward the end of the data collection period, a formal Care Quality Commission (CQC) 
inspection took place with the home receiving a 3 star (adequate) rating—an improvement 
on previous outcomes. The process of inspection involved examination of all documen-
tation and interviews with eight staff and a number of residents. Interviewees, however, 
had been identified by the home manager. One care assistant, Janine from Kenya, with an 
immigration status tying her to employment in the care sector, described her experiences 
in the interview with CQC. Janine was providing financial support to her daughter and her 
disabled mother, both of whom resided in Kenya. She commented:
As if I would tell them [CQC inspectors] what is really going on here. I told them 
nothing and I said everything was good here…If I get sacked then I’ve got one month 
to find another job or I have to leave the UK. Would they give me a good reference? 
Most homes round here are owned by them [this company] anyway.
Processes, tasks and activities on-the-floor were not observed, and managers were given a 
significant degree of control over access to information.
In actuality, meeting the needs of residents happened outside of formal expectancies and 
emerged from the competing informal pressures. As already noted, the majority of the staff 
appeared to have a strong commitment to providing support for residents. Some residents 
were more capable of asking or demanding care than those with more severe intellectual or 
cognitive impairments. Workers developed favorites and those whom they disliked, which 
also shaped the selection and timing of care tasks. Formally sanctioned work processes 
largely failed. The inadequacy of care arose from both constrained resources and failing 
regulation and, accordingly, can be described as structured by state policies and corporate 
objectives. External regulation orientated around the inspection of documentation rather 
than scrutinizing the health and well-being of residents or any attempt to observe the work. 
By means of performative compliance and regulation, a degree of credibility or legitimacy 
was achieved for both corporate involvement in the residential sector and the government’s 
wider funding and marketization policies. The actual everyday practices performing regu-
lation required that care files were completed, care records updated carefully, and training 
expectations fulfilled. At the same time, intervention by external authorities was insubstan-
tial and focused on a small selection of interviews with staff members, thereby constitut-
ing a further example of “regulation without enforcement” (Tombs 2016). Regulation was 
performative in that it was a means for securing political acceptability for the continuance 
of, what is arguably, a failing system. In ensuring that all records were complete, the corpo-
ration in question appeared compliant.
Through detailed scrutiny of the records, official regulatory authorities enact an image 
of toughness, conducting independent, impartial and thorough examinations of service-
quality. In reality, the very existence of regulatory procedures, accompanied by the for-
mally stated commitment by providers to follow these regulations, helps to provide an 
overarching legitimacy to the industry. Both seek to appear as though standards are imple-
mented, training regimens adhered to, and careful and accurate record keeping is in place. 
Arguably, the very existence of this bureaucratic regime establishes a veneer of compliance 
dissuading other types of scrutiny from, for example, family members. This situation is a 
further case of a permissive form of regulation, composed through state–corporate rela-
tionships (Tombs 2016; Whyte 2014)—although in this case, regulation is geared toward 
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legitimizing a sector which may well be deeply harmful. The next section uncovers some 
of the violent effects within the care home discussed.
Performing Compliance and Harmful Care in Three Dimensions
The poor quality of care which emerged as a result of the underfunded labor process and 
the performative compliance with regulatory frameworks had disastrous results for the 
residents. Three dimensions of care work are discussed here to reveal the harm associated 
with care-failure to the fore: (1) person-centered care; (2) moving and handling; and (3) 
feeding and nutrition. Associated with each dimension is also a set of harms. The formally 
advised methods of working, the actual informal practices and the associated harms for 
each of the three dimensions of care are mapped out in Table  1. These are not exhaus-
tive, as a whole host of other elements of the care could have been highlighted, such as 
assistance with incontinence, the control of toxic and dangerous substances, and practices 
relating to palliative care. The intention in this section is to show how those regulatory or 
official aspects of care (the formal) are effectively performative because they fail to ensure 
that care takes place as it supposed to as workers fall into a series of alternative informal—
and harmful— practices.
A skeptical, but not wholly dismissive stance is assumed toward the recommendations 
of regulation (Timmersmans and Almeling 2009). Compliance and fulfillment of approved 
standards would have seen an identifiable improvement in services, yet would likely have 
still sidelined the care relationship in favor of physiological needs.
1. Person-centered care
Person-centered care decrees that providers must take action to ensure that care “is based 
on an assessment of [service users] needs and preferences” (CQC 2018a, b, c). In addi-
tion, users of care must be supported to make informed choices. The company in question 
adopted and reproduced the discursive construction that their care was defined by individ-
ual choice and control. This quotation is from the 2009 financial annual report:
Our aim is to make it a home from home. That is what our concept of personalised 
care is all about—making sure that our residents can carry on normal life as far as 
possible just as if they were still living in their homes. That means treating every-
one for who they are—individuals—with rights to privacy, dignity and choice in all 
aspects of their lives.
In one training session, entitled “Dignity in Care,” conducted by a regional manager, the 
importance of delivering choice in all aspects of the service was communicated to care and 
kitchen workers. Clothing, daily routines, food and drink preferences, and leisure pursuits 
were all identified as areas of life where users should exercise decision making. The role of 
staff in this vision of care was to make these choices a reality. Shirleen, a regional manager, 
stated:
How many times have you just poured a resident a drink without offering them a 
choice? How many times have you picked a resident’s outfit for the day without con-
sulting them?… That’s we we’re trying to achieve here. Residents should be able to 
choose what they do day to day.
Performative Compliance and the State–Corporate Structuring…
1 3
Ta
bl
e 
1 
 Fo
rm
al 
an
d i
nf
or
m
al 
wo
rk
in
g p
ra
cti
ce
s m
ap
pe
d w
ith
 as
so
cia
ted
 ha
rm
s i
n f
ou
r d
im
en
sio
ns
 of
 ca
re
Di
m
en
sio
n o
f c
ar
e
Fo
rm
al 
as
pe
cts
 of
 th
e l
ab
or
 pr
oc
es
s (
ali
gn
ed
 
to
 re
gu
lat
or
y f
ra
m
ew
or
ks
 an
d m
an
ag
er
ial
ly
 
en
do
rse
d p
ra
cti
ce
s)
In
fo
rm
al 
wo
rk
in
g p
ra
cti
ce
s (
m
eth
od
s o
f w
or
k-
in
g d
ep
ar
tin
g f
ro
m
 fo
rm
al 
pr
es
cr
ip
tio
ns
)
As
so
cia
ted
 ha
rm
s
Pe
rso
n-
ce
nt
er
ed
 ca
re
Pr
in
cip
les
 of
 “c
ho
ice
” a
nd
 se
rv
ice
-u
se
r c
on
tro
l 
pr
om
ot
ed
 co
ns
ist
en
tly
 in
 tr
ain
in
g a
nd
 ad
ve
rti
s-
in
g m
ate
ria
l
Fa
ilu
re
 to
 de
liv
er
 pe
rso
na
liz
ati
on
 co
ns
tru
cte
d a
s 
“a
bu
se
”
Ri
gi
d t
em
po
ra
l a
nd
 sp
ati
al 
ro
ut
in
e
Fo
cu
s o
n m
ee
tin
g p
hy
sio
lo
gi
ca
l n
ee
ds
 ra
th
er
 
th
an
 so
cia
l o
r e
m
ot
io
na
l n
ee
ds
De
ni
al 
of
 au
to
no
m
y o
ve
r e
ve
ry
da
y d
ec
isi
on
s a
nd
 
th
er
efo
re
 co
ns
tra
in
in
g o
pp
or
tu
ni
tie
s f
or
 in
tel
-
lec
tu
al,
 so
cia
l a
nd
 em
ot
io
na
l fl
ou
ris
hi
ng
M
ov
in
g a
nd
 ha
nd
lin
g
En
do
rse
m
en
t o
f u
sin
g t
he
 ap
pr
op
ria
te 
m
ac
hi
n-
er
y, 
no
 us
e o
f “
str
ap
,” 
an
d c
or
re
ct 
sta
ffi
ng
 
lev
els
Fr
eq
ue
nt
 us
e o
f s
tra
p f
or
 li
gh
ter
 an
d m
or
e 
m
ob
ile
 re
sid
en
ts
Co
nt
rav
en
tio
n o
f s
taffi
ng
 le
ve
ls 
(e
.g.
, o
fte
n o
ne
 
sta
ff,
 in
ste
ad
 of
 tw
o, 
fo
r o
pe
ra
tin
g s
tan
d-
aid
 
an
d h
oi
st)
Us
e o
f w
ro
ng
 sl
in
g s
ize
 fo
r s
tan
d-
aid
 an
d h
oi
st
Sl
id
e s
he
ets
 us
ed
 ra
re
ly
Ab
ra
sio
ns
 an
d b
ru
ise
s f
ro
m
 in
co
rre
ct 
m
ov
in
g a
nd
 
ha
nd
lin
g
Pe
rsi
ste
nt
 lo
we
r b
ac
k p
ain
 fo
r c
ar
e a
ss
ist
an
ts
Ph
ys
ica
l i
nj
ur
y f
ro
m
 fa
lls
/sl
ip
s
Nu
tri
tio
na
l c
ar
e
En
do
rse
m
en
t o
f c
ul
tu
ra
lly
 di
ve
rse
 an
d h
ig
h-
qu
ali
ty
 di
et
Ra
tifi
ca
tio
n o
f i
nt
en
se
 on
e-
on
-o
ne
 fe
ed
in
g 
pr
ac
tic
es
 fo
r s
ev
er
ely
 co
gn
iti
ve
ly
 or
 ph
ys
ica
lly
 
im
pa
ire
d r
es
id
en
ts
Po
or
 qu
ali
ty,
 in
ex
pe
ns
ive
 an
d c
ul
tu
ra
lly
 in
se
ns
i-
tiv
e f
oo
d
Li
m
ite
d c
ho
ice
 of
 fo
od
stu
ffs
 an
d b
ev
er
ag
es
On
e-
on
-o
ne
 as
sis
ted
 fe
ed
in
g/
dr
in
ki
ng
 cu
t s
ho
rt 
du
e t
o l
ac
k o
f s
taff
Us
e o
f n
ut
rit
io
na
l m
ilk
 dr
in
ks
 in
 an
 at
tem
pt
 to
 
ov
er
co
m
e l
ac
k o
f c
alo
rie
 in
tak
e
M
aln
ut
rit
io
n a
nd
 de
hy
dr
ati
on
; s
om
eti
m
es
 se
ve
re
 
we
ig
ht
 lo
ss
, e
sp
ec
ial
ly
 on
 en
try
 to
 th
e h
om
e
Ur
in
ar
y t
ra
ct 
in
fec
tio
ns
 (a
ss
oc
iat
ed
 w
ith
 co
nf
u-
sio
n/
de
lir
iu
m
)
 J. Greener 
1 3
Through the 2-hour session, failure to deliver personalized care was equated with abuse. 
As one care assistant (Bethany) said shortly after the training course, many felt that deliv-
ering the sanctioned person-centered care was difficult if not impossible:
Yeah but we abuse people all the time…They’ve said to us that this is abuse [not 
delivering personalised care], whenever somebody says they don’t want to do some-
thing and we say they have to, that’s abuse…Or whenever we say “right come on you 
it’s time to do this.” It’s all abuse.
The rigid and routinized schedule was one of the key components of the organization of 
the work which ensured a minimal level of care. The need to maintain the routine often 
competed with an employee’s ability to assist residents in personal decisions. Residents 
would sometimes challenge the routine in order to better suit their desires or preferences. 
One resident, Jane, who no longer wished to spend her days in the lounge area, asked to 
be left in her own room. The manager, against the workers’ wishes, accepted her bidding 
and, for around two weeks, Jane was permitted to stay in her own room. Jane liked staff 
to spend one-on-one time with her in room and frequently rang the buzzer in order to ask 
for refreshments. Demands on staff time quickly resulted in her choice being overruled. 
There was minimal support provided for leisure activities and the rigidity of the daily rou-
tine limited engagement with individual residents and made it difficult to support residents’ 
wishes. Workers were very much aware of how the routinized nature of care impacted the 
ability to be responsive to individual needs. Becky, a senior care assistant, lamented:
In this job there’s never any time to spend with anybody [residents]. It’s a rush every 
day. If you get behind in the morning then everything is out of sync for the rest of the 
day…like sitting and talking to residents is what we should be doing but like any of 
us have time for that.
The failure of person-centered care has serious implications. Opportunities for form-
ing relationships and shaping the residents’ daily lives were severely limited, leaving lit-
tle scope for the promotion of emotional, intellectual and social flourishing. Practices in 
the home represented a direct denial of resident’s status as social beings (Garside 2013)—
or what could be described as “autonomy harms” (Pemberton 2015: 29). The style of 
care limited severely the capacity for self-actualization through social participation and 
self-determination.
2. Moving and Handling
The Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE) advice on hoisting equipment describes a num-
ber of practices which can compromise safe use (HSE 2011: 1). These include selection of 
the wrong size of sling, incorrect equipment for the task, and poor maintenance. Much of 
the moving and handling practices in the home were direct contraventions of formal HSE 
regulations with improper use revolving around two separate practices: use of inappropri-
ate equipment for resident/task and insufficient number of operators for the equipment.
In order to rationalize efforts given the restrictive staffing levels, workers often utilized 
inappropriate equipment for the task-at-hand. This is best underlined by the use of a trans-
fer belt that was known colloquially by workers as “the strap.” The strap is intended for 
assisting care recipients with only minor mobility problems very short distances, such as 
from a wheelchair to a toilet. It affixes round the midriff and contains a series of handles 
for lifting the person. In moving handling training, imparted by a regional manager, the 
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transfer belt was taken from the living room, where it normally stayed, and was used as a 
prop during the training session. Diane, a regional manager, explained:
This [holds up the transfer belt], should never be used. These are considered com-
pletely unsafe now and we should always be using a stand-aid or a hoist. This can be 
used as extra protection for helping people get up to the stand-aid handles.
At the conclusion of the training, attendees were required to sign sheet indicating that the 
guidelines were understood. The manager replaced the strap in the lounge area, and Bon-
nie (a care assistant), while using the strap shortly thereafter, noted the hypocrisy of the 
situation:
If they don’t want us to use the strap why didn’t she take it with her? She knows 
that some of the residents like being lifted this way and she knows it saves us time.
There were a limited number of stand-aids and hoists in the home—bulky pieces of 
machinery that required properly fitting slings. Using the hoist or the stand-aid was 
laborious as it required workers to find the devices (which could be anywhere around 
the home) and then transfer them to the required location. The hoist required attention 
to ensure that the sling was fitted safely first and both stand-aids and hoists were oper-
ated gently. Similar practices were applicable to slide sheets. In order to prevent abra-
sions, special sheets should be employed when repositioning immobile residents on 
their bed. These were rarely used, however, as fitting the sheet was time-consuming as 
compared to lifting.
Using equipment without the prescribed staff levels was common. Correct use of 
stand-aids and hoists required two operators. HSE (2011: 2)guidance on hoisting states 
that “two handlers are required: one to operate the hoist; the other to help steady things 
and, where needed, support the person’s lower legs to keep them in a safe position 
when moving from one place to another.” This guideline of two-to-one, while using the 
heavier lifting machinery, was often ignored as workers sought to perform tasks under 
pressure.
These contraventions of guidelines were (and continue to be) harmful for both work-
ers and residents. Persistent back pain and musculoskeletal disorders have been associ-
ated with nursing and care work (Yassi and Lockhart 2013). The HSE (2011) notes that 
its guidelines on safe moving and handling are intended to prevent musculoskeletal dis-
orders for workers and the injury or even death of care recipients. Many workers in this 
site complained frequently about persistent pain.
It was perilous for the resident every time he/she was lifted with an inappropriate 
piece of equipment or minimum operator protocols were violated (HSE 2011). And, as 
noted above, serious injuries and deaths have been documented as a result of inappro-
priate usage of moving and handling equipment.
3. Nutritional care
The third dimension is the inadequate provision of residents’ nutritional needs. Nutri-
tional care, for it to be aligned with regulatory prescriptions, should produce healthy 
and tasty nourishment, while ensuring support and assistance for feeding. The CQC 
(2018c) stipulates that care providers must ensure hydration and nutrition are adequate 
to “sustain life and good health.”
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At the facility where I conducted this study, hydration and nutrition were not 
recorded accurately as workers usually noted just the recommended number. For exam-
ple, 1500 milliliters in fluid intake (the recommended daily amount) was documented 
for every resident, even if staff were unsure of how much an individual had imbibed. 
For the most infirm, it could take as long an hour to finish a meal even with consider-
able assistance. Workers compensated for this by giving residents high-calorie drinks to 
complement their diets. The quality, diversity and cultural sensitivity of the food avail-
able were also substandard.
A range of physical harms were associated with the poor nutritional care. These 
included high instances of urinary tract infections, which is associated with mild dehydra-
tion (Beetz 2003), and heightened confusion and delirium (Balogun and Philbrick 2014), 
as well as weight loss, especially in the early stages of admittance.
Discussion
While some previous studies have suggested that informal modes of delivering care are 
essential, as human needs are unpredictable and not easily subsumed into bureaucratic 
forms of planning (Lopez 2007), this study has shown that informal modes of working may 
have a more sinister side. These harms emerged from the inability of staff and management 
to implement forms of care in accordance with regulatory visions of quality and wider 
company-stated intentions. The failure to meet basic physical and social needs for residents 
in this private-sector care home emerged at the intersection of state policies and corporate 
objectives—a form of state–corporate harm structured through a political economy of pri-
vatization and an accompanying facade of tokenistic regulation. While this study is limited 
by its focus on only one care home, there is evidence that residential care for older people 
and adult social care, more generally, are shaped by deep-rooted macro-structural contra-
dictions. The harms described are social in nature because they are not the result of poor 
training, bad management or some technical problem with work organization per se, but 
arise from the political and economic forces shaping care. The dynamics described in this 
article reveal that the formal aspects of caring—those enacted by regulatory authorities—
are superseded by material conditions, which can lead standards to be enacted discursively 
but practically inactivated.
These contradictions—between state expectations and material conditions of care—
arise at the juncture between profit motives and wider neoliberal welfare state priorities. 
The harm embedded in the residential care market can be seen as state-initiated and facili-
tated (Kramer et  al. 2002). The case discussed here, however, is better understood with 
reference to wider institutional processes and a deeper analysis of the role of regulation in 
the care sector. The state “has a clear role in creating and maintaining” all markets (Tombs 
and Whyte 2015: 23), and this is true in social care. The destruction of state-led social care 
and the simultaneous creation of a market, originally through NHS and the Community 
Care Act of 1990, has resulted in widespread privatization and corporate involvement, cou-
pled with continued funding difficulties. By setting the rates of funding, the state has con-
strained the quality of care, restricting the amount of resources at the hands of the provid-
ers. Given the structural formation of the market, cost reduction has emerged as a central 
strategy for achieving profitability. Any reduction in costs, such as limiting staffing levels or 
reducing production expenses, has tended to increase the margin between funding collected 
and money “left over”—or profit. Both factors impart structural pressures toward continual 
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rationalizing of staffing and other costs in the labor process. The surrounding market con-
ditions (profit motives and funding arrangements) create an entrenched propensity for firms 
to follow strategies which have damaging effects for workers and residents. This structural 
preconditioning toward limiting costs shapes other strategies, such as a reliance on immi-
grant labor, as a source of a cheap, highly exploitable work force (Anderson 2010). As the 
residential care market has matured, large multinational corporations have obtained a larger 
market share. These providers have a number of benefits at their hand: they are able to seek 
cost-savings through economies of scale; they have eliminated competition by instigating 
local or regional strongholds; and they are able to more effectively lobby the government 
for beneficial policies, such as applying pressure for increasing fee rates (Scourfield 2007, 
2012). In essence, state funding falls below what would be necessary to begin to build the 
sorts of care environments, across the whole of society, that are conducive with promoting 
well-being. Corporate involvement, however and profit motives, more generally, from the 
evidence uncovered here, can be seen to compound problems with funding because provid-
ers are attempting to extract profits from already meager funds.
Regulation serves a particular role in the institutionalization of this market and in facili-
tating the accumulation of corporations. Regulatory efforts—such as inspections, commit-
ments to standards of care or training requirements—can be seen as legitimacy-seeking 
exercises. In this case of social care for older people, regulatory efforts fall considerably 
short of even representing real attempts to secure or deliver quality, which is not surprising 
considering the welfare funding that might be required to ensure care in practice. What is 
uncovered in this study is that compliance with various standards becomes feigned by the 
corporation just as policing is performed by the so-called independent regulators.
Theories of regulation tend to see the state as antagonistically opposed to—or at least 
somehow separate from—big business. On the contrary, regulatory efforts attempt to repro-
duce existing conditions rather than representing a tangible attempt to exert control over 
businesses (Tombs and Whyte 2010a, b). In the case of social care, it may be that the pri-
mary intention of regulation is to give credence to the overall system and the accumulation 
of private enterprises that takes place by establishing the appearance of regulatory effort 
coupled with an illusion of corporate compliance. This relationship produces and masks 
harm, establishes an institutional environment where a market for social care is reproduced 
continually, and, lastly, protects the sector from more serious and intence political scrutiny. 
Rather than containing the worst aspects of corporate activity in this sector, regulation may 
serve to obscure what might be widespread routine forms of injurious activity through a 
veil of bureaucratic compliance.
Conclusion
The focus on the state–corporate relationship is a relevant starting place for understand-
ing neglect and mistreatment in many care homes and other welfare facilities under con-
temporary neoliberalized public services. Both social harm and state–corporate crime 
perspectives offer powerful critical lenses for improving our understanding of the inter-
play between state practices and corporate agendas in the production of deleterious con-
sequences inside welfare services. Given the range and extent of corporate involvement in 
welfare services, these perspectives offer useful tools for explaining harm and violence in 
other areas of social policy.
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As a final comment, the performative compliance that was uncovered in this case study 
does seem to give justification for state–corporate crime scholars to continue to develop 
and engage with alternative and non-conventional research strategies. Had a more tradi-
tional interview-based strategy been followed in this instance, it is unlikely that the extent 
of the neglect or the underlying causative mechanisms would have been uncovered.
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